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A MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE? A COMMENT ON THE
PROTECTION OF DATABASES
JANE C. GINSBURG*
INTRODUCTION
Daniel Gervais concluded his analysis of the protection of databases
with three options for the future.' I would like to examine a fourth. Let us
assume no future flurry of national or supranational legislative activity
because the content of databases is in fact already being protected. Not
through copyright or sui generis rights, but through other means. Databases
are an object of economic value, and they will conveniently wed whatever
legal theory or theories will achieve the practical objective of preventing
unauthorized exploitation of the works' contents. To beat the marriage
metaphor into the ground, I'd like to suggest that, at least in the U.S., data-
bases today can avail themselves of the traditional range of wedding gifts:
"something old, something new, something borrowed, something blue."
The something old is contract law; the something new is the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act;2 the something borrowed is the newly reminted tort
of "trespass to chattels"; 3 and the something blue-using "blue" in the
sense of something risqu6 and perhaps objectionable-is digital rights
management, reinforced by the anti-circumvention protections of § 1201 of
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
4
I. SOMETHING OLD
Contracts have served to secure valuable information long before the
digital era. Financial information, "hot news," and such have been the ob-
* Morton L. Janklow Professor of Literary and Artistic Property Law, Columbia University
School of Law. Thanks for research assistance to Margaret Ciavarella, Columbia Law School class of
2007.
I. Daniel J. Gervais, The Protection of Databases, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1109 (2007).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000).
3. See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 404-05 (2d Cir. 2004); eBay, Inc. v.
Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1069-73 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
4. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000).
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ject of subscription contracts. 5 Courts have upheld the subscribers' contrac-
tually incurred obligations not to disclose the information to third parties,
even though the information did not benefit from copyright protection.
6
With digitization of the information and development of standard, mass-
market contracts, courts have continued to uphold the contracts' restrictions
on reuse of the information, 7 even though the shrink-wrap--and especially
the click-wrap or browse-wrap--nature of those "agreements" significantly
erode the distinction between inter-partes contract rights and erga-omnes
property rights. I will not elaborate further on contracts as a means of creat-
ing defacto intellectual property rights, because that is the topic of S&ver-
ine Dusollier's paper for a later panel of this conference.
8
II. SOMETHING NEW
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA") creates civil and
criminal liability for one who "knowingly and with intent to defraud, ac-
cesses a protected computer without authorization, or exceeds authorized
access, and by means of such conduct furthers the intended fraud and ob-
tains anything of value. .. ."9 As a threshold standing requirement, the
claimant must have sustained an aggregate loss of at least $5,000 in the
course of a year. 0 A "protected computer" under the CFAA is any com-
puter used in "interstate or foreign commerce or communication," which in
effect includes virtually all computers in commercial use, for example, any
computer connected to the Internet. The two sections of the CFAA most
relevant to database protection are § 1030(a)(2)(C), which prohibits inten-
tionally accessing without authorization or exceeding authorized access to a
computer, and thus obtaining information from a protected computer; and
§ 1030(a)(5)(C), which prohibits intentionally accessing a protected com-
5. See, e.g., Bd. of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236 (1905) (confidential grain
price quotations); F.W. Dodge Co. v. Constr. Info. Co., 66 N.E. 204 (Mass. 1903) (reports of building
construction information); Exch. Tel. Co. Ltd. v. Gregory & Co., [1896] 1 Q.B. 147 (C.A.) (financial
information disclosed to subscribers); see also Ladd v. Oxnard, 75 F. 703 (C.C.D. Mass. 1896) (credit
ratings of stone dealers; restricted circulation kept work within common law copyright).
6. See, e.g., F. W. Dodge, 66 N.E. at 206. Courts have also upheld trade secret protection for
confidential sales and business information. See, e.g., RKI, Inc. v. Grimes, 177 F. Supp. 2d 859 (N.D.
II1. 2001) (proprietary system listing customer and sales information); Newlnno, Inc. v. Peregrim Dev.,
Inc., No. CV010390074S, 2002 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3907 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 27, 2002) (system
tying expert consultants to customers and containing data on each).
7. See, e.g., Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. County Sheriff's Dep't, 447 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 2006);
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996).
8. Srverine Dusollier, Sharing Access to Intellectual Property Through Private Ordering, 82
CHi.-KENT L. REv. 1391 (2007).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (2000).
10. Id.; see also Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393 app. at 439-40 (2d Cir. 2004)
(Parker, J., draft opinion).
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puter without authorization, and as a result of such conduct, causing dam-
age or loss. Courts have interpreted "unauthorized access" broadly. The
First Circuit, for instance, has held that "[a] lack of authorization could be
established by an explicit statement on the website restricting access."' I In
other examples, database producers have successfully pleaded CFAA
claims in cases involving the "scraping" of pricing information from a tour
operator's database 12 and the copying of market data reports. 13 CFAA
claims may be particularly useful against competitors who systematically
copy frequently updated information from a "dynamic" database.
III. SOMETHING BORROWED
The old wine in a new bottle, or-consistent with our opening meta-
phor-the old legal theory recycled with new gift-wrapping, is the common
law action of "trespass to chattels." At common law, a defendant commits
trespass to chattels when he intentionally either "dispossess[es] another of
the chattel" or "us[es] or intermeddl[es] with a chattel in the possession of
another."' 14 Liability for intermeddling attaches only if "the chattel is im-
paired as to its condition, quality, or value, or ... the possessor is deprived
of the use of the chattel for a substantial time,. . . or... harm is caused to
some person or thing in which the possessor has a legally protected inter-
est." 15 The tort made its computer-age debut in Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek.
There, a group of teenagers obtained a secret access code to a long distance
telephone company and repeatedly dialed into its network in an endeavor to
make free long-distance calls. Although they failed, their insistent attempts
tied up a substantial portion of the telephone network. The court ruled that
the electronic signals forming the network constituted the chattel with
which the teenagers interfered, and held them liable for trespass to chat-
tels. 16
The first use of the tort specifically in the Internet context occurred in
CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc. There, the court found trespass
to chattels when the defendant sent large quantities of spam to Compu-
I1. EF Cultural Travel BV v. Zefer Corp., 318 F.3d 58, 62 (lst Cir. 2003).
12. Id. at 63; EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 2001).
13. I.M.S. Inquiry Mgmt. Sys., Ltd. v. Berkshire Info. Sys., Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 521, 524-26
(S.D.N.Y. 2004). See generally James A. Tanner, How Much Protection Is Too Much: Using the Com-
puter Fraud and Abuse Act as an Appropriate Means to Protect Compilations of Data, SYRACUSE SC.
& TECH. L. REP., Spring 2004, http://www.law.syr.edu/students/publications/sstlr/framesets/ ar-
ehive/arehived/spring04/James.pdf.
14. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217 (1965).
15. Id. § 218(b)-(d).
16. 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 472-73 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
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Serve's customers. The volume of the emails burdened and slowed down
CompuServe's networks, and many customers, frustrated by receiving
spain, discontinued their CompuServe subscriptions. 17 Other courts have
adapted the trespass to chattels action to redress network operators' com-
plaints of "spamming."' 18
In 2000, the Northern District of California, in eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's
Edge, Inc., significantly expanded the concept of "harm" in cyberspace
trespass to chattels claims. Bidder's Edge was an auction aggregation ser-
vice that used "spidering" technology-a high-powered automated search
method enabling continuous updating of large quantities of data-to gather
data from auction websites such as eBay, so that consumers could compare
the price of a given item across online auction sites. Despite eBay's objec-
tion to Bidder's Edge's data collection, Bidder's Edge continued to spider
eBay's site. In the ensuing lawsuit, eBay prevailed on its trespass to chat-
tels claim, even though it could not show actual harm to its website-such
as slow or impaired functioning-or lost customers, as the spamming
claimants had. The court reasoned that allowing Bidder's Edge to spider
would encourage other auction aggregators to do so as well, and this com-
bined effect would be likely to harm the performance of eBay's computer
system. 19
Despite widespread concern among legal scholars that extension of the
trespass to chattel tort to situations in which no actual damage can be
shown will lead to suboptimal use of Internet resources, 20 courts in other
17. 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
18. See, e.g., America Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444, 451-52 (E.D. Va. 1998)
(holding that unsolicited bulk email constituted trespass to chattels); America Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F.
Supp. 2d 548, 550-51 (E.D. Va. 1998) (same).
19. 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1069-73 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
20. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, The Trouble with Trespass, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 27, 39-
54 (2000) (arguing that application of trespass to chattels to digital environment is inappropriate and
dangerous); Edward W. Chang, Bidding on Trespass: eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc. and the Abuse of
Trespass Theory in Cyberspace Law, 29 AIPLA Q.J. 445 (2001) (predicting that application of the eBay
holding will chill use of Internet databases); Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the
Digital Anticommons, 91 CAL. L. REV. 439, 500-18 (2003) (arguing that overexpansion of Internet
property rights will destroy Internet's value as a common resource). But see Daniel Kearney, Network
Effects and the Emerging Doctrine of Cybertrespass, 23 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 313 (2005) (proposing
possible benefits and positive incentives to the public from current cybertrespass doctrine).
Commentators also object to the adaptation to computer networks of a tort conceived to
protect tangible property. See, e.g., Laura Quilter, The Continuing Expansion of Cyberspace Trespass to
Chattels, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 421, 438 (2002) (arguing that "[tihe trespass to chattels doctrine,
designed to ensure that a single, indivisible piece of tangible property is available to its owner" is
difficult to apply to a "chattel" whose entire purpose is to be part of a network accessible to and used by
others); Burk, supra, at 33-34 (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 13, at 71 (5th ed. 1984)). Burk argues that the current line of trespass to chattels cases has
ignored the tort's roots as "the little brother of conversion." Both torts are intended to remedy the
"dispossession" of a chattel; conversion is total dispossession and trespass to chattels is partial dispos-
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jurisdictions have adopted eBay's approach. For example, in Register.com,
Inc. v. Verio, Inc., the Second Circuit upheld the district court's denial of a
motion to dismiss a trespass to chattels claim where Verio used a search
robot-a software program which performs multiple automated queries-to
search the database of Internet domain names on the plaintiffs website.
The court followed the same slippery slope reasoning as the eBay court,
stating that allowing one ISP to use a search robot on the site would most
likely lead others to do so as well and collectively overtax Register.com's
computer system.
21
While some courts have placed limits on Internet-related trespass to
chattels claims where little or no actual damage to the plaintiffs computer
system can be shown,22 decisions like eBay and its progeny still offer a
formidable arm to database proprietors who seek to prevent the extraction
of information from their electronic databases. Among database proprie-
tors, the greatest beneficiaries of trespass. to chattels claims are likely to be
the larger and more commercially important dynamic databases, for these
are the types of databases for which an effective search may well require
robots or other such technologies.
IV. SOMETHING BLUE2 3
Finally, among extra-copyright means of protecting databases, resort
to legally-secured technological protection measures may be the most con-
troversial. It may also enjoy broader use than some of the other "wedding
gifts," because the protection attaches to the collection of data, not to a
computer network through which the data might be accessed. A database
producer could always distribute the product with an access- or copy-
session. But in finding that an owner has been "dispossessed" of her moving electrons when other
electrons pass through them just as they are designed to, courts are effectively striking out the term
"dispossess" and redefining the tort as a rule of inviolability. This is the standard associated with tres-
pass to land, not chattels. Id.
21. 356 F.3d 393, 404 (2d Cir. 2004).
22. See, e.g., Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV997654HLHVBKX, 2003 WL
21406289, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2003) (dismissing trespass to chattels claim because defendant's use
of search robots only caused negligible harm to plaintiff); see also Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296,
302-11 (Cal. 2003) (refusing to hold that six mass emails to Intel employees are a sufficient burden on
Intel's computer system to sustain trespass to chattels claim). But see Oyster Software, Inc. v. Forms
Processing, Inc., No. C-00-0724 JCS, 2001 WL 1736382, at **11-13 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2001) (declin-
ing to follow Ticketmaster's requirement of "more than negligible" harm to plaintiff to sustain trespass
to chattels claim). Oyster Software was also a search robot case.
23. This section is adapted from Jane C. Ginsburg, U.S. Initiatives to Protect Works of Low Au-
thorship, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE
KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 55 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001).
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control, but until the 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"),24
others were probably free to hack those controls, either directly or through
a generally distributed circumvention device. The DMCA added § 1201 to
the Copyright Act; that provision defined three new violations: First,
§ 1201(a)(1) prohibits circumvention of technological protection measures
that control "access" to copyrighted works. Second, § 1201 (a)(2) makes it a
violation to manufacture, disseminate, offer, etc. devices, services, etc. that
circumvent access controls. Finally, § 1201(b) makes it a violation to
manufacture, disseminate, offer, etc. devices or services, etc. that circum-
vent a technological measure that "effectively protects a right of the copy-
right owner .... "25 While these provisions address protection of
copyrighted works, a database producer who password-protects, encrypts,
or otherwise technologically protects the contents of a minimally original
compilation might be able to rely on § 1201 to insulate those contents from
copying, even if the material sought to be reproduced is not copyrightable.
Although § 1201 (a) governs "a work protected under this title," it does
not specify how much of the work must be protected, nor does it distin-
guish "thin copyright" works from more creative endeavors. As a result, to
benefit from § 1201(a), it appears that so long as a database producer does
not merely encrypt raw public domain documents or unoriginal listings of
information, but instead packages the information with copyrightable trap-
pings-such as a new introduction, or minimally original reformatting 26-
the database would be a copyrighted work, however scant the covering.
This suggests that the copyrightable "fig leaf' a database producer affixes
to an otherwise unprotectable work could, as a practical matter, obscure the
public domain nakedness of the compiled information.
Section 1201 does include a variety of exceptions to the prohibition on
access circumvention, but these are extremely specific, and none directly
apply to databases. 27 Worse, the extraordinarily narrow drafting of the ex-
ceptions discourages attempts to discern from them an overall legislative
policy regarding the kinds of circumventions that should offset copyright
owners' enhanced ability to control access to their works. Indeed, if any-
thing, the proliferation of special case exceptions, and Congress's delega-
24. Pub. L. No. 105-304, §§ 103, 202, 112 Stat. 2860, 2863-76, 2877-86 (1998) (adding §§ 1201-
1203 and § 512 to the Copyright Act of 1976).
25. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)-(b) (2000).
26. See, e.g., MaIjack Prods., Inc. v. UAV Corp., 964 F. Supp. 1416, 1426-29 (C.D. Cal. 1997)
(holding that "panning and scanning" modifications to a film in the public domain are copyrightable),
aff'd on other grounds sub nom., Batjack Prods., Inc. v. GoodTimes Home Video Corp., 160 F.3d 1223
(9th Cir. 1998).
27. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(d)-fl).
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tion to the Copyright Office to make triennial rulings exempting certain
classes of works, 28 prompt the negative inference that any access circum-
vention not expressly legislatively or administratively exempted is prohib-
ited.29
Arguably, § 1201(c) accords courts residual authority to expand ex-
ceptions to access control. That provision specifies that nothing in § 1201
affects "defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use, under this
title."' 30 But a violation of § 1201(a) is not copyright infringement; it is a
new violation for which the DMCA provides distinct remedies. 31 Nonethe-
less, circumvention claims remain copyright dependent, since § 1201 cov-
ers only measures that protect access to copyrighted works. Perhaps, were a
court persuaded that the challenged act of circumvention (or use of an ac-
cess-circumvention device) would not under the circumstances lead to
copyright infringement, because-as in the case of a copyrightable "fig
leaf' covering a collection of public domain information-whatever access
to a copyrighted work the act or device permits is incidental and necessary
to access unprotected data, then the circumvention might be excused. 32
RETURNING THE GIFTS TO THE STORE
Ultimately, indirect approaches to database protection, such as those
discussed here, cannot provide a comprehensive response to the problems
of either the under- or overprotection of databases. Not all non-original
databases will benefit from a quasi-property regime derived from claims of
interference with computer networks. Notably, if the database proprietor is
not also the computer network operator, those claims would not seem to
apply. By the same token, the CFAA would not assist modest proprietors; it
28. See id. § 120 1(a)(I)(B)-(D).
29. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 443 n.13 (2d Cir. 2001).
30. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1).
31. See id. § 1203. Remedies for copyright infringement are set forth at id. §§ 502-510.
32. Cf Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng'g & Consulting, Inc., 421 F.3d 1307, 1311-
19 (Fed. Cit. 2005) (holding that circumvention of the code controlling access to data library mainte-
nance software did not violate § 1201 because access did not "facilitate copyright infringement"; copies
made in RAM once the software was accessed were copies permitted under the § 117(c) exception for
computer maintenance); Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1197-1203
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (involving the circumvention of computer code controlling access to a garage door; the
court interpolated into § 1201 a requirement that the protection against circumvention of an access
control be related to protection against infringement).
That said, however, one must recognize that not all databases that § 1201(a) might otherwise
overprotect are plainly of the "fig leaf' variety. It will not always be easy to distinguish the pretextual
copyrightable "fig leaf' from a substantial authorship contribution. For example, the copyrightable
work incorporating public domain information might be a compilation or collective work containing
both copyrightable and public domain elements.
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does not redress appropriations that do not cause over $5,000 in aggregate
annual loss. Moreover, bootstrapping database protection to technological
protection measures is not likely to install a sensible intellectual property
regime, whether from the point of view of information providers or users.
Keeping in mind the dangers of sui generis legislation (whose pitfalls in the
E.U. Daniel Gervais has documented) it might nonetheless be preferable to
devise a statute attentive to both users and proprietors, and carefully tai-
lored to ensure meaningful incentives to gather, organize, and disseminate
information, without unduly encumbering research and derivative uses of
the collected information.
